Urban primacy, gigantism, and international trade: Evidence from Asia and the Americas by Moomaw, Ronald L. & Alwosabi, Mohammed A.
econstor
www.econstor.eu
Der Open-Access-Publikationsserver der ZBW – Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
The Open Access Publication Server of the ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Die ZBW räumt Ihnen als Nutzerin/Nutzer das unentgeltliche,
räumlich unbeschränkte und zeitlich auf die Dauer des Schutzrechts
beschränkte einfache Recht ein, das ausgewählte Werk im Rahmen
der unter
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
nachzulesenden vollständigen Nutzungsbedingungen zu
vervielfältigen, mit denen die Nutzerin/der Nutzer sich durch die
erste Nutzung einverstanden erklärt.
Terms of use:
The ZBW grants you, the user, the non-exclusive right to use
the selected work free of charge, territorially unrestricted and
within the time limit of the term of the property rights according
to the terms specified at
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
By the first use of the selected work the user agrees and
declares to comply with these terms of use.
zbw
Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Moomaw, Ronald L.; Alwosabi, Mohammed A.
Working Paper
Urban primacy, gigantism, and
international trade: Evidence from Asia
and the Americas
ZEI working paper, No. B 20-2003
Provided in cooperation with:
Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn
Suggested citation: Moomaw, Ronald L.; Alwosabi, Mohammed A. (2003) : Urban primacy,
gigantism, and international trade: Evidence from Asia and the Americas, ZEI working paper,













Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung
Center for European Integration Studies
Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn




Evidence from Asia and the
Americas
B 20
2003Urban Primacy, Gigantism, and International Trade:






Center for European Integration Studies
University of Bonn
Phone: 405-744-7359






                                               
* Corresponding authorABSTRACT
Gustavsson [1999] finds that policies that promote international trade increase the size of a country’s largest
city relative to the country’s total population, which is defined here as an increase in urban gigantism.  In
contrast, Ades and Glaeser [1995] report urban gigantism is reduced by freer political institutions and, with
less confidence, more open trade.  In light of Henderson’s (2000) findings that excessive urban concentration
inhibits economic growth, these conflicting results for the relationship between openness and urban gigantism
(concentration), which are of great interest for the new economic geography, call for additional study.  This
study uses two measures of urban concentration and finds that lower international-trade costs are associated
with lower primacy, but not with lower gigantism. Unlike Gustavsson, however, we find no evidence that
lower trade costs increase gigantism.Urban Primacy, Gigantism, and International Trade:
Evidence from Asia and the Americas
I.  Introduction
Advances in urban economics and the new economy geography, discussed in Brakman et al.
(2001), Fujita et al. (1999), Henderson (1996), Krugman (1996) have revived interest in the effects of
economic development, political economy, and international trade on urban concentration, particularly in
developing countries.  Henderson’s finding (2000) that excessive urban concentration inhibits economic
growth heightens the importance of understanding its determinants.  In this regard, Gustavsson’s (1999)
report that restrictive trade policies reduce the size of a country’s main city relative to its urbanized
population—called gigantism in this study—is of great importance.  Other studies have found that trade
openness or lower trade costs reduce similar measures of urban concentration.  Ades and Glaeser (1995),
for instance, report that restrictive international trade policies have contributed to gigantism, but their
result is not robust.  Moomaw and Shatter (1996) report that larger export shares of GDP are associated
with reduced gigantism.  Given the diversity of results, the first purpose of this paper is to provide
additional information about the effects of international-trade costs on urban concentration.
Ades and Glaeser (1995) also find that the percentage of labor outside agriculture, a development
indicator, also has a positive effect on main-city size, but they do not find an association between it and
real GDP per capita.  Moomaw and Shatter (1996) find that higher literacy levels, another development
indicator, increase reduce gigantism.  So, a second purpose of this paper is to examine the link between
development and urban concentration. 
Besides conflicting findings regarding the effects of trade costs, these papers do not deal with
urban primacy as originally defined.  Jefferson (1939) originally defined it as the ratio of the population
of the largest city to that of the second largest city.  Several primacy ratios, incorporating the largest city
and the next largest cities, have been used (Mutlu 1989), as have summary measures of the size
distribution of cities, such as the Herfindahl index and a parameter of the Pareto distribution (Mutlu 1989;2
Rosen and Resnick 1980; and Wheaton and Shishido 1981).   Among students of economic development,
excessive primacy raises concern (supported by (Henderson 2000)) that a large city, which is “too large”
given the system of cities, may retard development (Sawers 1989).   A city that dominates the rest of the
country may adversely affect the growth of other cities and economic diversification among regions.  In
the urban primacy literature, much emphasis has been put on the possibility that excessive concentration
or primacy in low-income countries may arise from the workings of the political process, a result
supported by AG (1995).
It would be convenient if the size of the largest city relative to total population or to urbanized
population could serve as a proxy for primacy ratios and summary size-distribution measures.  Certainly,
the larger the main city, other things equal, the greater the dominance of the main city.
1   Consequently,
another purpose of this paper is to determine how closely the determinants of gigantism match the
determinants of the primacy ratio.  The primacy ratio is emphasized rather than summary measures of the
size distribution because of the cost of collecting the data necessary to construct a panel of size-
distribution measures.
2
Table 1 shows the correlations among primacy ratios that others have used to measure urban
concentration.  The ratios of main-city to second-city population and main-city to the sum of the
populations of cities 2 through 4 have a simple correlation coefficient of 0.98, suggesting that the two
variables measure essentially the same concept.  The correlations with the ratio of main-city population to
urbanized population—implicitly the ratio used by Ades and Glaeser—are smaller, 0.69 and 0.70; those
with the main-city national-population ratio are 0.39 and 0.34.  Although these correlations are
significant, they imply that only one-half of the variation in the two- and four-city ratios is common to the
variation in the ratio of main-city population to urbanized population.  The information in the two-city
primacy ratio may be sufficiently different that understanding the determinants of main-city size, holding
urbanized population constant, does not provide an understanding of the primacy.
Urban concentration is a focus of neoclassical urban systems and of the new economic geography
(Henderson 1996). In modeling urban concentration, Krugman (1996) lists four stylized facts as3
cornerstones.  They are that urban concentration (1) falls with income per capita, (2) increases with the
concentration of political power, (3) is affected by the transportation infrastructure, and (4) falls with
trade openness.  His empirical support for these stylized facts is limited.  His specific references are to
Ades and Glaeser (AG) for fact 2 and to Rosen and Resnick for facts 3 and 4.  In light of the increasing
importance of the new economic geography, the paper’s final purpose is to provide more information on
Krugman’s stylized facts.  
In this paper we use the AG framework to understand the effects of international-trade costs on
gigantism and primacy and to compare their determinants.  We use the same equation to explain the two
variables because we want to see if studying urban primacy provides useful information additional to that
obtained from studying main-city size.  First, we apply the Ades-Glaeser equation and method to our data
to estimate the determinants of main-city size and urban primacy.  We then use panel-data techniques to
estimate the equations.  Our paper extends the recent economics literature on urban concentration in
several ways.  First, it contributes to the understanding of the relationship between trade costs and
concentration.  Second, its focus is on urban primacy, using a more traditional measure.  Third, it
specifically compares the determinants of urban primacy and main-city size.  Fourth, it uses panel data in
five-year intervals from 1960 to 1990 and exploits it with the fixed-effects estimator.  Fifth, it estimates
the determinants of the fixed effects.
Our results on trade costs are consistent with the implications of the new economic geography
and with the tentative empirical results that lower international-costs costs reduce urban concentration. 
We find no support for Gustavsson’s result that trade restrictions reduce gigantism.   Although our results
are generally consistent with those of Ades and Glaeser, we also find that urban concentration cannot be
analyzed completely with main-city size as the variable explained. Finally, with appropriate modification,
the results conform to Krugman’s stylized facts concerning urban concentration.4
II. The Determinants of Gigantism and Urban Primacy: A Cross-Section Approach
A.  The Data
Ades and Glaeser average their data over four years (1970, 1975, 1980, and 1985) for 85
countries and Gustavsson averages data over the decade of the 1980s (where possible) for 34 third-world
countries.  We limited our sample to 30 countries from Asia and the Americas, but we construct a thirty-
year panel (in five-year increments).  Most of the observed variation regarding gigantism and primacy is
present in the sample.  For instance, rapid urbanization and mega-cities exist in both Asian and American
countries.  The sample includes a variety of countries: developed, less developed and those experiencing
rapid or slow growth.  Each country satisfies the following criteria: (1) a total population of two million
or more in 1990, (2) a nation-state not a city-state, eliminating Hong Kong and Singapore, and (3) not a
socialist or ex-socialist country.  These criteria give 33 countries.  Because of data unavailability, we drop
Haiti, Jamaica, and Nepal.  Therefore, our sample includes 30 countries: 11 countries from Asia, 17 from
Latin America, and 2 from North America.
3
This sample includes countries with very large population such as India with about 850 million
people in 1990 and countries such as Panama with only about 2.5 million. (See Table 2 for descriptive
statistics.)  It includes among the main cities, mega-cities such as Tokyo with more than 25 million
inhabitants in 1990 and smaller cities such as San Jose (capital of Costa Rica) with 297 thousand
inhabitants.  It also encompasses a wide range of development, from low-income countries such as India
with GDP per capita of $1,264 in (PPP) to high-income countries such as the United States, $18,054 in
1990.  Some countries have a highly primate city, for instance, Thailand with its main city 26 times larger
than its second city; others, such as Canada, have a main city with much less than twice the population of
the second city.
B.  The Specification and Cross-Section Results
Ades and Glaeser rely on Krugman and Elizondo (1996), as does Gustavsson (1999), for the
hypotheses that urban concentration will increase with internal transportation costs and decrease with
international trade.
4  Krugman’s hypothesis regarding the role of trade costs is based on the importance of5
the economy’s size in realizing economies of scale.  In the presence of agglomeration economies, the total
demand for specialized products (intermediate or final goods) in a small, closed economy may support
only one viable production site.  The site could develop into a very large city, giving the country a large
primacy ratio.  If the same economy were open and had sufficiently low international-trade costs, the
specialized products, which would otherwise be produced in the large city, could be imported, loosening
the tie that binds firms to the main city.   In addition, if firms can export specialized goods, which
otherwise could only be sold in a large city, their ties to the economy’s main city are loosened.  AG use
the share of trade in GDP and in some instances, a measure of tariffs, to test the international trade
hypothesis.  Gustavsson uses indicators of the share of trade in GDP, tariffs, and non-tariff barriers in a
similar test. 
In Ades and Glaeser’s framework, the results of the tradeoff between economies of scale and
transportation costs are captured by controlling the country’s population, land area, GDP per capita, and
nonagricultural employment.
5  Gustavsson, on the other hand, controls so-called push and pull factors
with rural population density, road density, and in some estimates GDP per capita.   Conditional on an
economy’s size and development, Ades and Glaeser develop a model of the effects of dictatorship and
political instability on main-city size.  They analyze urban concentration assuming that government taxes
capital-city and hinterland residents so as to maximize a utility function with government rents and
survival as arguments.  The capital city or main city must be treated with care because, by assumption,
successful coups originate there. The hinterland can be taxed more heavily, but this stimulates migration
to the main city.  By assumption the median voter is in the hinterland; so, if the hinterland tax is too high,
a democratic government may be voted out.  A dictatorial government does not face this prospect; so its
hinterland tax can be higher, causing an increase in main-city size in a dictatorship relative to a
democracy. 
A greater propensity to revolt—political instability—also increases main-city size in the AG
model because the government placates rebellious residents by reducing the main-city tax, which
stimulates migration to the main city.  In the model, political instability has a smaller effect in a6
dictatorship than in a democracy.  A larger differential exists between city and hinterland taxes in a
dictatorship than in a democracy, making the main city larger in the dictatorship.  Because the main city is
smaller in a democracy, an increase in political instability results in a larger effect on main-city
population than it does under a dictatorship.   Therefore, the city-size effect is greater in a less stable
democracy than in a less stable dictatorship.   
AG test these propositions with a dictatorship variable, an instability variable, and the interaction
of the two. Their model implies that main-city size will be greater under a dictatorship and will increase
with political instability.  It also predicts that political instability will make the main city larger under a
democracy than it would under a dictatorship.  Their dictatorship variable is a dummy variable taking the
value of one if countries do not protect political rights, as measured by the Gastil index of political rights.
 We use a similar dictatorship variable.  (See Appendix A for variable definitions and sources.)  They
measure political instability by the average number of revolutions and coups; our political instability
variable is similar.  Interacting political stability with the dictatorship variables allows a test of the
hypothesis that political instability increases main-city size more in a democracy than in a dictatorship. 
In our empirical analysis, we first replicate the AG basic equations with our data.  We obtain
results similar to theirs, suggesting that any differences we find are due to different specifications and
estimators rather than different samples. Table 3 presents three AG specifications of the cross-section
model for main-city size and estimates of the models using main-city size (gigantism) and urban primacy
as dependent variables.  The first specification takes the dependent variable as a function of a
dichotomous variable indicating whether the main city is the capital city, the logarithm of national
population, the logarithm of land area, the logarithm of GDP per capita, the logarithm of the share of the
labor force outside agriculture, and the logarithm of the share of exports in GDP; the estimated
coefficients indicate that the capital-city effect and national population both increase main-city size—
gigantism. Furthermore, gigantism increases with the share of nonagricultural labor and, in contrast to
Gustavsson, decreases with export’s share of GDP.   7
The second specification adds an indicator variable for the existence of a dictatorship.  This
equation differs from AG’s equation 3 (AG, 1995, p.209) by only one variable.  We have replaced
nonurbanized population and the urbanized population outside the main city with national population. 
Table 3 gives our results for main-city size in column four and the AG results for the same equation in
column five.  Even though the samples differ, the results are consistent, conveying similar information. 
First, main-city size is negatively correlated with export shares. Second, main-city size increases with
capital-city status, population, and labor outside agriculture.  For these four variables, our results are quite
similar to the AG results.  Our coefficients of land and dictatorship are both positive, like the AG
coefficients, but they are not significant. 
The third specification adds the political instability variable and its interaction with the
dictatorship variable.  Like AG, we find that main-city size increases with dictatorship indicator and
political instability and that the coefficient of their interaction is negative, indicating that political
instability has a greater effect in a democracy than in a dictatorship. 
Do the results from the gigantism equation carry over to the primacy equation?  To answer, we
regress urban primacy, measured as the logarithm of the population of the main city divided by the
population of the second city, on these same variables.  Similarities exist among the coefficients between
the two equations.  In particular, the export and capital city variables yield the same qualitative results.
The coefficients of total population have different signs.  Main-city size increases less than in proportion
to population; thus, population has a positive coefficient.  But it is less than 1, implying that the main-city
share of population declines as population increases.  The negative population coefficient in the primacy
equation, however, implies that the second city increases in size relative to the main city as population
grows.  Estimating both equations yields more information; specifically, it suggests that the size of the
two cities in the upper tail of the size distribution of cities increases and becomes more equal with greater
national population.
Important differences between the primacy equation and the main-city equation, however, are for
industrialization (nonagricultural labor’s share) and the political variables.  The industrialization variable8
is positive and significant in the main-city equations, but it is negative and larger than its standard error in
the primacy equation.   Similarly, the political variables are significant in the main-city equation, but they
are not significant in the primacy equation. Note, however, that the dictatorship variable takes a similar
value in both sets of equations, and is about one and one-half times its standard error in the primacy
equation.  
The comparison of the primacy and gigantism equations shows that studying gigantism is not
equivalent to studying primacy; the AG political and industrialization results for main-city size do not
carry over to primacy.  Furthermore, Krugman’s stylized facts are not well supported.  In particular, the
concentration of political power (except the capital city effect) and GDP per capita are not significant
determinants of primacy, and GDP per capita is not associated with main-city size.
6
Rejecting the stylized facts is premature, however, as is concluding that the results of the
gigantism equation do not carry over to a primacy equation.  First, interpretation of the results requires
careful attention to the specification.  For instance, the coefficient of the logarithm of GDP per capita is
insignificant in Table 3, but if we respecify the independent variables as the logarithms of population
density, GDP, and GDP per capita, we obtain a significant positive coefficient for GDP per capita in the
gigantism equation.
7  Second, and more important, we examine the robustness of the results by exploiting
the richness of the panel data computing fixed-effects estimates of the AG equation.
III. The Determinants of Gigantism and Urban Primacy: A Panel Approach
AG consider and reject using a panel estimator because it requires putting “some structure on
how lagged values of country characteristics change current urban concentration” (p.204, fn.  9). Instead
they use averages of the four observations for each cross-section unit; similarly, Gustavsson uses averages
over a decade.  In effect, they use the between estimator rather than the dummy-variable or within
estimator.   By using the between estimator, they neglect the information contained in the temporal
variation of the cross-section units (Judge, et al. 1988).  If urbanization patterns respond to growth in9
population density or to technical change that increases GDP or GDP per capita, ignoring the temporal
variation within the cross-section unit sacrifices substantial information.
8
The between estimator uses a single cross section and thus eliminates the possibility of using
country effects to capture omitted variables. Gustavsson’s parsimonious equation uses rural population
density and road density to control what she calls the push-pull effects and internal trade costs.  In a
second equation she adds GDP per capita. AG, in contrast, use several control variables.  Both
Gustavsson and AG are aware of the bias introduced by omitted variables and thus attempt to include
appropriate control variables.  Nevertheless, cross-sectional analysis of country data risks the omission of
important fixed factors that affect urban concentration.  Examples might be a country’s colonial history or
its geography.   Henderson (1996), in his discussion of Krugman’s urban concentration models,
emphasizes that some of Krugman’s results depend upon initial conditions.  Specifically, he states, “the
impact of trade on national space is situation specific, depending upon the precise geography of the
country” (p.33).  We believe that Henderson’s comments about the situation-specific nature of the impact
of trade also apply to political, transportation, and other impacts, calling for recognition of the potential
importance of country effects in estimating gigantism and primacy equations.  Consequently, we are
willing to assume that the independent variables have a contemporaneous effect on primacy, because by
doing so we capture the temporal variation in the cross-section unit and, importantly, we can include
country fixed effects, which reduces the risk of omitted variable bias.
The results presented in Table 4 correspond to specifications 1 and 2 in Table 3.  Because we
treat political factors as time invariant (except for capital city and dictatorship), we do not have an
estimate that corresponds to specification 3 in Table 3.  We tested for random effects and found in most
cases that they were correlated with the regressors.  Consequently, we use the dummy-variable estimator.
An examination of the first four columns in Table 4 shows substantive changes from Table 3: 
First, GDP per capita is positively associated with main-city size and primacy.  It does not, therefore,
support Krugman’s stylized fact regarding the relationship between income per capita and urban
concentration. Second the coefficient of nonagricultural labor is positive and significant for both main-10
city size and primacy.  Thus, in the fixed effects estimates, the coefficients of two development indicators,
GDP per capita and nonagricultural labor, suggest that urban concentration, however measured, increases
with development.   Although it was not so in Table 3, the coefficient of the dictatorship variable is
significant in the primacy equation, but unlike the AG result it is not significant in the main-city equation.
The final important change is that export’s share of GDP loses significance in both equations.  In contrast,
the capital-city variable and the population variable have the same qualitative effects as in Table 3. 
Finally the land variable does not have significant coefficients.
So far, two of Krugman’s stylized facts concerning urban concentration are not supported in the
panel-data analysis. Concentration does not decrease with development and open economies do not show
less concentration.  To delve deeper into the development and concentration issue, we rewrite the
specification to emphasize population density, GDP, and GDP per capita.  It currently is lny = ln a +
b lnPOP + c lnLAND￿￿ + d ￿ ln (GDP/POP) + (other variables, parameters, and error terms) where POP is
population and LAND is land area.  With algebraic manipulation, it can be written as lny = ln ￿ a - c ln
(POP/LAND) + ￿ ( d - b - c) ln (GDP/POP) + (￿ b + c) ￿￿  ln GDP + (other terms).  By showing primacy and
main-city size as functions of population density, GDP per capita, and GDP, this version of the equation
relates better to the tension between transportation costs and economies of scale.  AG argue that
population density proxies for transportation cost, with the expectation that greater density implies lower
transportation cost and less urban concentration.   Henderson (1988) and Wheaton and Shishido (1981)
expect urban concentration to increase with GDP per capita, perhaps reaching a maximum and
decreasing. Finally, Moomaw and Shatter (1996) argue that as the size of the economy increases, the
concomitant division and specialization of labor (Smith, 1776; Stigler, 1951; and Evans, 1972) allows
industries and countries to disperse, achieving economies of specialization at a smaller size.  Because
efficient production facilities can be located at more sites, transportation cost can be reduced by dispersal
without sacrificing production efficiency.  The coefficient of size, of GDP, is expected to be negative.11
 Columns 5-8 in Table 4 show the estimates of the rewritten equation; the coefficients of the
capital city indicator, nonagricultural employment, exports as a share of GDP, and the dictatorship
indicator are necessarily the same as in the first four columns because the basic equation has not changed
9 The most important results come from the coefficients of GDP and GDP per capita. The coefficient of
GDP, of course, shows the effect of a change in GDP, holding other variables in the equation constant. 
To increase GDP and hold constant population density, GDP per capita, and exports as a proportion of
GDP, it is necessary to increase population, exports, and land area by the same proportion.  Therefore, the
coefficient of GDP gives the effect of a proportionate increase in four dimensions of an economy’s size—
population, area, GDP, and exports; it is positive for main-city size (gigantism) and negative for primacy.
 Larger economies, in this sense, have larger main cities, but the increase in main-city size is not larger
than the increase in economic size, i.e., not greater than 1.  Furthermore, the negative coefficient in
primacy equation implies that the proportionate increase in the size of the second city is larger than that of
the main city. 
GDP per capita’s coefficient, just as the sign of GDP’s coefficient, differs in the two equations,
but it is negative for main-city size and positive for primacy.  A ceteris paribus change in GDP per capita
is obtained by reducing population and land area by the same proportion, holding GDP constant. 
Economy A has the same GDP as economy B, but economy B has a smaller population and a smaller land
area.  Economy B, therefore, has a greater GDP capita and a greater GDP per unit of land.  Because
economy B has a smaller population it is not surprising that it has a smaller main-city size.  What may be
surprising is that its primacy is greater, implying that second-city size decreases more than main city size.
 In short, primacy increases with GDP per capita.  This increase in primacy may be interpreted as the
concentrating effect of a more advanced technology (Henderson, 1988) or a demand effect related to the
income elasticity of demand for main-city goods. The results for GDP and GDP per capita suggest that
the appropriate stylized fact is that “large” economies have less primacy or less urban concentration than
“small” economies rather than the rich-poor comparison that Krugman makes.   We find that economies12
with greater levels of development, as measured by GDP per capita and industrialization
(nonagricultural employment as a share of total employment) have greater primacy than economies that
are less developed.
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Although we confirm the basic AG findings regarding main-city size, their results cannot simply
be applied to primacy or presumably to other measures of urban concentration.  In analyzing urban
concentration—main-city size, primacy, or other measures—we believe that panel-data results provide
information beyond that obtained from between estimators or other cross-section estimators.  To this
point, however, the panel approach does not support AG’s results regarding international-trade costs and
political variables.  In the next section, we examine these issues.
IV. The Effects of International Trade and Internal Politics on Gigantism and Primacy 
In the fixed-effects estimates the export share of GDP does not have a significant coefficient in
any of the equations.  Furthermore, because we did not have appropriate data, we were unable to test the
political instability hypotheses with panel data.  In this section we explain why we think the export
variable was insignificant and provide evidence that trade and trade openness are associated with lower
levels of urban concentration, supporting the Krugman hypothesis.  We also support AG’s hypotheses
regarding political instability, dictatorship, and gigantism, but these results do not carry over to primacy. 
The fixed-effects equations rely on temporal variation in each country to estimate the relevant
coefficients.  Just as the between estimator downplays temporal variation, the fixed-effect estimator
downplays cross-sectional variation. For variables with limited temporal variation, it is not surprising to
find their coefficients insignificant in fixed-effects estimates.    We believe that political instability is a
variable that has limited temporal variation for many countries.  Has a country that has several revolutions
and coups over a five-year span followed by a five-year span of no such events developed greater
stability?  Perhaps, but it may also be that the propensity has not changed. If its political institutions
become freer from one period to the next, does the ability of its government to exploit the hinterland
without being booted out change?  Again, perhaps.13
The importance of imports and exports in affecting a country’s economic geography also has an
element of inertia.  It depends on the economic and political benefits and costs of free trade.  If these
benefits and costs change slowly, then an increased proportion of exports in GDP from one period to the
next may indicate a more open trade policy or it may be short-term effect subject to reversal. 
Consequently, it might not be wise to make site-specific investments in response to the availability of
foreign inputs and markets.  Perhaps the trade regime will be reversed. If the trade and political variables
have little variation in the time series and more variation in the cross section, it may be more appropriate
to consider them as fixed for the panel.   We can test the importance of such variables by recovering and
attempting to explain the fixed effects.  To do so, we use averaged export shares and averaged political
variables as regressors.     The first step is to retrieve the fixed effects from equations like those in
Table 4.  Because we are assuming trade and political factors fixed, we recover the fixed effects from new
estimates that omit the export-share and the dictatorship variables.   Because we are particularly interested
in the international trade variable we present four sets of regressions with each set using a different trade
variable.  The first trade variable is the export-share variable: because it is a measure, however crude, of
the international purchases and sales of goods and services.  It is these actual foreign purchases and sales
that allow firms to loosen their ties with an economy’s main city.   The other trade measures are TARIFF,
NONTARIFF, and POTENTIAL (Lee, 1993). TARIFF is a weighted average of 1988 tariffs on a
country’s imports of intermediate inputs and capital goods, and NONTARIFF is a measure of other
barriers to the same imports.  POTENTIAL is computed based on a country’s area and its distance from
important trading partners. Because POTENTIAL is computed using a country’s geography—its area and
its location relative to other countries—it is a particularly appropriate given our interest in new economic
geography.
The first four columns of Table 5 report regressions using the average export share of GDP as the
measure of international-trade costs.  Countries with larger average export shares have smaller main cities
(p = 0.15) and lower primacy (p = .01). This is consistent with one of Krugman’s stylized facts and
suggests that, other things equal, a more open economy has a greater extent of the market, allowing
greater spatial dispersal of economic activity.  The equations with other trade variables are in columns 5-
10.  The coefficients of the trade variable in the three additional gigantism equations are not close to14
significance, but they are significant in two of the three additional primacy equations, with signs that
support the Krugman hypothesis.  The positive sign on the trade variable, when it is measured by tariffs,
of course, says that trade restrictions are associated with increased primacy, or that reducing restrictions is
associated with reduced primacy.  When the trade variable is measured by potential, the negative sign for
the primacy equation is consistent with the Krugman hypothesis.
11  No support is found for the
Gustavsson result that reductions in international-trade costs increase primacy or gigantism. 
Dictatorship, political instability, and their interaction are significant in the gigantism equation,
using the average export share (columns 1 and 2), just as they are in Table 3 and in AG. Dictatorship is
significant in the gigantism equations with the three other trade variables and political instability and the
interaction variable have the expected signs.  Political instability and the interaction variable were not
significant in the first primacy equation, so they not included in the last 3 estimates.  The dictatorship
variable is consistently positive in the primacy equations, and it was significant for primacy in the fixed-
effects estimates in Table 3.
The finding that political instability does not increase primacy but does increase the size of the
main city is revealing.  It suggests that in unstable, democratic societies the hinterland is a dangerous
place, stimulating movement to the larger cities, where government can more easily provide protection.  It
is not, however, just to the main city to which people flee from the hinterland; they also flee to the second
and perhaps other large cities.  Thus, the main-city effect tends to positive, but the primacy effect is not
significant.
Now introduce dictatorship into a society of average instability. Other things equal, main-city size
and primacy increase, implying that the size of the main city increases more than that of the second city. 
Consequently, dictatorship tends to concentrate population in the main city, whereas instability tends to
concentrate it proportionately in the largest cities.  Although the t statistics are low for the political
variables in the remaining gigantism equations, the signs of the coefficients are the same as in column 1.
Our empirical results show that equations explaining main-city size cannot be applied ipso facto
to primacy. The dictatorship variable and the capital city variable both provide support for Krugman’s
assertion that urban concentration is enhanced by political factors.15
V.  Conclusion
This paper has four purposes. The first is to provide additional information about the effect of
international-trade costs on urban concentration. The second is to examine the associations between
economic development and urban concentration. The third is to determine if the AG results regarding
main-city size apply to urban primacy and thus determine if gigantism and primacy are determined in the
same way.  The fourth is to provide information about Krugman’s stylized facts.  We have tentative
conclusions for each purpose.  Because we use the dummy-variable estimator, however, we cannot extend
our inferences beyond the sample.  Consequently, our conclusions are applicable only to countries in Asia
and the Americas.  Second, the economic and demographic economic data, particularly the city-size data
and the political data, are not perfectly measured.   With these provisos, we offer the following
conclusions.
First, we find no support Gustavsson’s result that openness or a greater importance of trade
increases concentration.  For these countries greater trade and trade potential has a strong negative effect
on urban primacy.  Openness to trade, however, has no effect on gigantism.  This implies that as trade
becomes more important, the second city, and perhaps other cities become larger.
Development has a positive association with both gigantism and primacy.  Political factors also
affect concentration, as evidenced by the capital-city effect, the dictatorship effect on primacy, and the
combined political instability and dictatorship effects on gigantism.
Third, studying main-city size is neither empirically nor theoretically isomorphic to studying
primacy
Finally, the paper supports two of Krugman’s propositions and an appropriately modified version
of another one.  In particular, urban primacy is less in more open economies, and it increases with
concentration of political power.  Contrary to Krugman, however, gigantism and primacy do not fall with
GDP per capita; in our specification they increase. This is not a new result. Wheaton and Shishido find
urban concentration increasing with GDP per capita up to a point, and Henderson’s results implicitly
suggest the same thing. Krugman’s theoretical arguments appear to be related more to the size of the
market than to economic development.  Our results show a strong negative relationship between primacy16
and the size of the market. Similarly, the size of the largest city does not increase as fast as the size of the
economy, suggesting that the largest becomes relatively less important as the economy gets larger. 17
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Appendix A: Variables and Sources
PRIMACY-- is the ratio of the largest city population to the population of the second largest city.
GDP--gross domestic product.  GDP is calculated from the Penn World Tables (Mark 5.6).
GDPC--gross domestic product per capita.  Source:  The Penn World Tables (Mark 5.6).
POP/Land--population density, which is the ratio of the total population to the arable land.  Sources:  total
population data are from The UN World Urbanization Prospects:  The 1992 Revision; arable land
data are from FAO Production Yearbook.
DCAP--dummy variable that equals 1 if the capital city is also the largest city and equals 0 otherwise.  Sources: 
UN Demographic Yearbook, and World Urbanization Prospects: The 1992 Revision.
EXPORT/GDP--exports of goods and nonfactor services as a percentage of GDP.  Sources:  World Tables, 1994
and different issues of World Development Report.
Nonagricultural employment--share of labor outside agriculture.  It is calculated as 1 minus the percentage of
economically active population in agriculture.  Source:  FAO Production Yearbook.
EXPORT--the ratio of export of goods and nonfactor services to GDP averaged over the year 1960 to 1990.
DICT--dictatorship variable (1 = free, 2 = partially free, 3 = not free).  Sources:  different issues of Gastil’s
Freedom in the World, and Bollen (1990), for cross-sectional data, it is averaged over 1975, 1980,
1985, and 1990.
POLINS--measures of political instability. (0.5 * assassination + 0.5 *revolution), average of 1965, 1970, 1975,
1980, and 1985.  Source:  Barro and Wolf (1990).
Popuation of the largest city population.  Sources:  UN Demographic Yearbook and World Urbanization Prospects.
 The 1992 Revision
*  Data for the Republic of China (Taiwan) are from different issues of The Republic of China Statistical
Yearbook, The Europa Yearbook, and The Statesman’s Yearbook.20
Table 1
Correlation Matrix of Urban Concentration Indices
1 2 3 4
1.  Main city population divided by second city
population
1.00
2.  Main city population divided by the sum of the
population of the next three cities.
0.98 1.00
3.  Main city population divided by urbanized
population.
0.69 0.70 1.00
4.  Main city population divided by total
population.




Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Primacy Ratio 30 5.1778 5.5609 1.138 25.49
Gross Domestic Product * 30 368570 867790 6983 4520000
GDP per capita 30 4612.0 4426.7 1264 18050
Population* 30 75700 158300 2418 849500
Main-City Population* 30 6203.5 6266.0 297.0 25010
Arable Land Area 30 20127 44544 285.0 187900
Population Density 30 8.2797 7.3156 0.5782 29.98
Capital City Indicator 30 0.80000 0.40684 0.0000 1.000
Exports/GDP 30 27.600 18.301 7.00 91.00
Nonagricultural Employment 30 0.67073 0.19089 0.3150 0.9720
Dictatorship
Indicator
30 1.5000 0.50855 1.000 2.000
*(000)22
Table 3
Comparison of Primacy and Main City: The Ades Glaeser Approach
VERSION 1 VERSION 2 VERSION 3
VARIABLE PRIMACY GIGANTISM PRIMACY GIGANTISM PRIMACY GIGANTISM

























































































































The number in parentheses is the t-statistic.  The number above it is the coefficient.
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 99 percent, 95 percent, and 90 percent levels, respectively.23
Table 4
Comparison of Primacy and Main City Fixed Effects Models
VARIABLE PRIMACY GIGANTISM PRIMACY GIGANTISM PRIMACY GIGANTISM PRIMACY GIGANTISM
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8














































































































The number in parentheses is the t-statistic.  The number above it is the coefficient.
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 99, 95, and 90 percent levels, respectively.24
Table 5
Political Determinants of Fixed Effects
AVERAGE EXPORT SHARE TARIFF NON TARIFF POTENTIAL
VARIABLE GIGANTISM PRIMACY GIGANTISM PRIMACY GIGANTISM PRIMACY GIGANTISM PRIMACY GIGANTISM PRIMACY


































































































2 0.12 0.18 0.05 0.24 0.07 0.13 0.06 -0.06 0.04 0.14
The number in parentheses is the t-statistic.  The number above it is the coefficient.
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 99 percent, 95 percent, and 90 percent levels., respectively.2526
ENDNOTES
                                               
1. This is essentially the approach taken by Moomaw and Shatter (1996) who examine the determinants of urban
primacy, where primacy is measured by the population of a country’s largest city as a share of the national
population. 
2. Because of the panel approach taken here, summary measures of the size distribution, such as the Herfindahl
index and the Pareto coefficient, are too costly in terms of data.  They would require a panel of size distributions
by country.  See Henderson (1988) and Rosen and Resnick (1980) for studies that use summary measures. 
3. The 30 countries, in alphabetical order, are:  Argentina, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia,
Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El-Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea
(south), Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand, United
States, Uruguay, and Venezuela. 
4. In addition, Brueckner (1990) and Wheaton and Shishido (1981), among others, emphasize transportation costs
and economic development as determinants of urban concentration.
5. Ades and Glaeser expect concentration to increase with industrialization because it requires more infrastructure
that in turn leads to concentration because of economies of scale.
6.  In fact, AG found that omitting the nonagricultural employment share resulted in a positive, not negative,
coefficient for GDP per capita.
7.  Because this is simply a rearrangement of the multiplicative population, land, and GDP terms, there is no effect
on the estimates of the other coefficients. (These results are not reported; they are available upon request.)
8. It has been suggested that with panel data in 5-year intervals, we are assuming rapid adjustment.   If some
variable, say exports or dictatorship, affect primacy with a significant lag, then the short intervals may give
misleading results.  To check the effect of intervals, we estimated the second set of primacy and main-city
equations in Tables 3 and 4, using 10 year intervals, reducing our cross-sections to four.  The results of this
estimate (available upon request) are very similar to those using 5-year intervals.  Consequently, we continue the
analysis with the 5-year intervals because they use more information.
9. Although these coefficients can be calculated from the estimates in the first four columns, reestimating the
equations is a convenient way to get the standard errors and t-statistics for the new coefficients.
10. Population density has a negative correlation with both measures of urban concentration.  Its marginal
probabilities (p values) for the gigantism equations are 0.21 and 0.17.  Because land area is measured as arable
land, it has temporal variation for a number of countries.  It does not vary as much over time, however, as
variables such as GDP per capita and population.  Although it varies enough to estimate the dummy-variable
equation, its lesser temporal variation may account for its insignificant coefficients.   Consequently, we do not
emphasize the land and population density results.
11. Based on the results for column 2, the specification for the remaining primacy equations omits the interaction
of dictatorship and instability.2008
B01-08 Euro-Diplomatie durch gemeinsame „Wirtschaftsregierung“ Martin Seidel
2007
B03-07 Löhne und Steuern im Systemwettbewerb der Mitgliedstaaten
der Europäischen Union
Martin Seidel
B02-07 Konsolidierung und Reform der Europäischen Union Martin Seidel
B01-07 The Ratiﬁcation of European Treaties - Legal and Constitutio-
nal Basis of a European Referendum.
Martin Seidel
2006
B03-06 Financial Frictions, Capital Reallocation, and Aggregate Fluc-
tuations
Jürgen von Hagen, Haiping Zhang
B02-06 Financial Openness and Macroeconomic Volatility Jürgen von Hagen, Haiping Zhang
B01-06 A Welfare Analysis of Capital Account Liberalization Jürgen von Hagen, Haiping Zhang
2005
B11-05 Das Kompetenz- und Entscheidungssystem des Vertrages von
Rom im Wandel seiner Funktion und Verfassung
Martin Seidel
B10-05 Die Schutzklauseln der Beitrittsverträge Martin Seidel
B09-05 Measuring Tax Burdens in Europe Guntram B. Wolﬀ
B08-05 Remittances as Investment in the Absence of Altruism Gabriel González-König
B07-05 Economic Integration in a Multicone World? Christian Volpe Martincus, Jenni-
fer Pédussel Wu
B06-05 Banking Sector (Under?)Development in Central and Eastern
Europe
Jürgen von Hagen, Valeriya Din-
ger
B05-05 Regulatory Standards Can Lead to Predation Stefan Lutz
B04-05 Währungspolitik als Sozialpolitik Martin Seidel
B03-05 Public Education in an Integrated Europe: Studying to Migrate
and Teaching to Stay?
Panu Poutvaara
B02-05 Voice of the Diaspora: An Analysis of Migrant Voting Behavior Jan Fidrmuc, Orla Doyle
B01-05 Macroeconomic Adjustment in the New EU Member States Jürgen von Hagen, Iulia Traistaru
2004
B33-04 The Eﬀects of Transition and Political Instability On Foreign
Direct Investment Inﬂows: Central Europe and the Balkans
Josef C. Brada, Ali M. Kutan, Ta-
ner M. Yigit
B32-04 The Choice of Exchange Rate Regimes in Developing Coun-
tries: A Mulitnominal Panal Analysis
Jürgen von Hagen, Jizhong Zhou
B31-04 Fear of Floating and Fear of Pegging: An Empirical Anaysis of
De Facto Exchange Rate Regimes in Developing Countries
Jürgen von Hagen, Jizhong Zhou
B30-04 Der Vollzug von Gemeinschaftsrecht über die Mitgliedstaaten
und seine Rolle für die EU und den Beitrittsprozess
Martin Seidel
B29-04 Deutschlands Wirtschaft, seine Schulden und die Unzulänglich-
keiten der einheitlichen Geldpolitik im Eurosystem
Dieter Spethmann, Otto Steiger
B28-04 Fiscal Crises in U.S. Cities: Structural and Non-structural Cau-
ses
Guntram B. Wolﬀ
B27-04 Firm Performance and Privatization in Ukraine Galyna Grygorenko, Stefan Lutz
B26-04 Analyzing Trade Opening in Ukraine: Eﬀects of a Customs Uni-
on with the EU
Oksana Harbuzyuk, Stefan Lutz
B25-04 Exchange Rate Risk and Convergence to the Euro Lucjan T. Orlowski
B24-04 The Endogeneity of Money and the Eurosystem Otto Steiger
B23-04 Which Lender of Last Resort for the Eurosystem? Otto Steiger
B22-04 Non-Discretonary Monetary Policy: The Answer for Transition
Economies?
Elham-Maﬁ Kreft, Steven F. Kreft
B21-04 The Eﬀectiveness of Subsidies Revisited: Accounting for Wage
and Employment Eﬀects in Business R+D
Volker Reinthaler, Guntram B.
Wolﬀ
B20-04 Money Market Pressure and the Determinants of Banking Cri-
ses
Jürgen von Hagen, Tai-kuang Ho
B19-04 Die Stellung der Europäischen Zentralbank nach dem Verfas-
sungsvertrag
Martin SeidelB18-04 Transmission Channels of Business Cycles Synchronization in
an Enlarged EMU
Iulia Traistaru
B17-04 Foreign Exchange Regime, the Real Exchange Rate and Current
Account Sustainability: The Case of Turkey
Sübidey Togan, Hasan Ersel
B16-04 Does It Matter Where Immigrants Work? Traded Goods, Non-
traded Goods, and Sector Speciﬁc Employment
Harry P. Bowen, Jennifer Pédussel
Wu
B15-04 Do Economic Integration and Fiscal Competition Help to Ex-
plain Local Patterns?
Christian Volpe Martincus
B14-04 Euro Adoption and Maastricht Criteria: Rules or Discretion? Jiri Jonas
B13-04 The Role of Electoral and Party Systems in the Development of
Fiscal Institutions in the Central and Eastern European Coun-
tries
Sami Yläoutinen
B12-04 Measuring and Explaining Levels of Regional Economic Inte-
gration
Jennifer Pédussel Wu
B11-04 Economic Integration and Location of Manufacturing Activi-
ties: Evidence from MERCOSUR
Pablo Sanguinetti, Iulia Traistaru,
Christian Volpe Martincus
B10-04 Economic Integration and Industry Location in Transition
Countries
Laura Resmini
B09-04 Testing Creditor Moral Hazard in Souvereign Bond Markets: A
Uniﬁed Theoretical Approach and Empirical Evidence
Ayse Y. Evrensel, Ali M. Kutan
B08-04 European Integration, Productivity Growth and Real Conver-
gence
Taner M. Yigit, Ali M. Kutan
B07-04 The Contribution of Income, Social Capital, and Institutions to
Human Well-being in Africa
Mina Baliamoune-Lutz, Stefan H.
Lutz
B06-04 Rural Urban Inequality in Africa: A Panel Study of the Eﬀects
of Trade Liberalization and Financial Deepening
Mina Baliamoune-Lutz, Stefan H.
Lutz
B05-04 Money Rules for the Eurozone Candidate Countries Lucjan T. Orlowski
B04-04 Who is in Favor of Enlargement? Determinants of Support for
EU Membership in the Candidate Countries’ Referenda
Orla Doyle, Jan Fidrmuc
B03-04 Over- and Underbidding in Central Bank Open Market Opera-
tions Conducted as Fixed Rate Tender
Ulrich Bindseil
B02-04 Total Factor Productivity and Economic Freedom Implications
for EU Enlargement
Ronald L. Moomaw, Euy Seok
Yang
B01-04 Die neuen Schutzklauseln der Artikel 38 und 39 des Bei-
trittsvertrages: Schutz der alten Mitgliedstaaten vor Störungen
durch die neuen Mitgliedstaaten
Martin Seidel
2003
B29-03 Macroeconomic Implications of Low Inﬂation in the Euro Area Jürgen von Hagen, Boris Hofmann
B28-03 The Eﬀects of Transition and Political Instability on Foreign
Direct Investment: Central Europe and the Balkans
Josef C. Brada, Ali M. Kutan, Ta-
ner M. Yigit
B27-03 The Performance of the Euribor Futures Market: Eﬃciency and
the Impact of ECB Policy Announcements (Electronic Version
of International Finance)
Kerstin Bernoth, Juergen von Ha-
gen
B26-03 Souvereign Risk Premia in the European Government Bond
Market (überarbeitete Version zum Herunterladen)
Kerstin Bernoth, Juergen von Ha-
gen, Ludger Schulknecht
B25-03 How Flexible are Wages in EU Accession Countries? Anna Iara, Iulia Traistaru
B24-03 Monetary Policy Reaction Functions: ECB versus Bundesbank Bernd Hayo, Boris Hofmann
B23-03 Economic Integration and Manufacturing Concentration Pat-
terns: Evidence from Mercosur
Iulia Traistaru, Christian Volpe
Martincus
B22-03 Reformzwänge innerhalb der EU angesichts der Osterweiterung Martin Seidel
B21-03 Reputation Flows: Contractual Disputes and the Channels for
Inter-Firm Communication
William Pyle
B20-03 Urban Primacy, Gigantism, and International Trade: Evidence
from Asia and the Americas
Ronald L. Moomaw, Mohammed
A. Alwosabi
B19-03 An Empirical Analysis of Competing Explanations of Urban Pri-
macy Evidence from Asia and the Americas
Ronald L. Moomaw, Mohammed
A. AlwosabiB18-03 The Eﬀects of Regional and Industry-Wide FDI Spillovers on
Export of Ukrainian Firms
Stefan H. Lutz, Oleksandr Talave-
ra, Sang-Min Park
B17-03 Determinants of Inter-Regional Migration in the Baltic States Mihails Hazans
B16-03 South-East Europe: Economic Performance, Perspectives, and
Policy Challenges
Iulia Traistaru, Jürgen von Hagen
B15-03 Employed and Unemployed Search: The Marginal Willingness
to Pay for Attributes in Lithuania, the US and the Netherlands
Jos van Ommeren, Mihails Hazans
B14-03 FCIs and Economic Activity: Some International Evidence Charles Goodhart, Boris Hofmann
B13-03 The IS Curve and the Transmission of Monetary Policy: Is there
a Puzzle?
Charles Goodhart, Boris Hofmann
B12-03 What Makes Regions in Eastern Europe Catching Up? The
Role of Foreign Investment, Human Resources, and Geography
Gabriele Tondl, Goran Vuksic
B11-03 Die Weisungs- und Herrschaftsmacht der Europäischen Zen-
tralbank im europäischen System der Zentralbanken - eine
rechtliche Analyse
Martin Seidel
B10-03 Foreign Direct Investment and Perceptions of Vulnerability to
Foreign Exchange Crises: Evidence from Transition Economies
Josef C. Brada, Vladimír Tomsík
B09-03 The European Central Bank and the Eurosystem: An Analy-
sis of the Missing Central Monetary Institution in European
Monetary Union
Gunnar Heinsohn, Otto Steiger
B08-03 The Determination of Capital Controls: Which Role Do Ex-
change Rate Regimes Play?
Jürgen von Hagen, Jizhong Zhou
B07-03 Nach Nizza und Stockholm: Stand des Binnenmarktes und
Prioritäten für die Zukunft
Martin Seidel
B06-03 Fiscal Discipline and Growth in Euroland. Experiences with the
Stability and Growth Pact
Jürgen von Hagen
B05-03 Reconsidering the Evidence: Are Eurozone Business Cycles
Converging?
Michael Massmann, James Mit-
chell
B04-03 Do Ukrainian Firms Beneﬁt from FDI? Stefan H. Lutz, Oleksandr Talave-
ra
B03-03 Europäische Steuerkoordination und die Schweiz Stefan H. Lutz
B02-03 Commuting in the Baltic States: Patterns, Determinants, and
Gains
Mihails Hazans
B01-03 Die Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion im rechtlichen und poli-
tischen Gefüge der Europäischen Union
Martin Seidel
2002
B30-02 An Adverse Selection Model of Optimal Unemployment Ass-
urance
Marcus Hagedorn, Ashok Kaul,
Tim Mennel
B29B-02 Trade Agreements as Self-protection Jennifer Pédussel Wu
B29A-02 Growth and Business Cycles with Imperfect Credit Markets Debajyoti Chakrabarty
B28-02 Inequality, Politics and Economic Growth Debajyoti Chakrabarty
B27-02 Poverty Traps and Growth in a Model of Endogenous Time
Preference
Debajyoti Chakrabarty
B26-02 Monetary Convergence and Risk Premiums in the EU Candi-
date Countries
Lucjan T. Orlowski
B25-02 Trade Policy: Institutional Vs. Economic Factors Stefan Lutz
B24-02 The Eﬀects of Quotas on Vertical Intra-industry Trade Stefan Lutz
B23-02 Legal Aspects of European Economic and Monetary Union Martin Seidel
B22-02 Der Staat als Lender of Last Resort - oder: Die Achillesverse
des Eurosystems
Otto Steiger
B21-02 Nominal and Real Stochastic Convergence Within the Tran-
sition Economies and to the European Union: Evidence from
Panel Data
Ali M. Kutan, Taner M. Yigit
B20-02 The Impact of News, Oil Prices, and International Spillovers
on Russian Fincancial Markets
Bernd Hayo, Ali M. KutanB19-02 East Germany: Transition with Uniﬁcation, Experiments and
Experiences
Jürgen von Hagen, Rolf R.
Strauch, Guntram B. Wolﬀ
B18-02 Regional Specialization and Employment Dynamics in Transi-
tion Countries
Iulia Traistaru, Guntram B. Wolﬀ
B17-02 Specialization and Growth Patterns in Border Regions of Ac-
cession Countries
Laura Resmini
B16-02 Regional Specialization and Concentration of Industrial Activity
in Accession Countries
Iulia Traistaru, Peter Nĳkamp, Si-
monetta Longhi
B15-02 Does Broad Money Matter for Interest Rate Policy? Matthias Brückner, Andreas Scha-
ber
B14-02 The Long and Short of It: Global Liberalization, Poverty and
Inequality
Christian E. Weller, Adam Hersch
B13-02 De Facto and Oﬃcial Exchange Rate Regimes in Transition
Economies
Jürgen von Hagen, Jizhong Zhou
B12-02 Argentina: The Anatomy of A Crisis Jiri Jonas
B11-02 The Eurosystem and the Art of Central Banking Gunnar Heinsohn, Otto Steiger
B10-02 National Origins of European Law: Towards an Autonomous
System of European Law?
Martin Seidel
B09-02 Monetary Policy in the Euro Area - Lessons from the First Years Volker Clausen, Bernd Hayo
B08-02 Has the Link Between the Spot and Forward Exchange Rates
Broken Down? Evidence From Rolling Cointegration Tests
Ali M. Kutan, Su Zhou
B07-02 Perspektiven der Erweiterung der Europäischen Union Martin Seidel
B06-02 Is There Asymmetry in Forward Exchange Rate Bias? Multi-
Country Evidence
Su Zhou, Ali M. Kutan
B05-02 Real and Monetary Convergence Within the European Union
and Between the European Union and Candidate Countries: A
Rolling Cointegration Approach
Josef C. Brada, Ali M. Kutan, Su
Zhou
B04-02 Asymmetric Monetary Policy Eﬀects in EMU Volker Clausen, Bernd Hayo
B03-02 The Choice of Exchange Rate Regimes: An Empirical Analysis
for Transition Economies
Jürgen von Hagen, Jizhong Zhou
B02-02 The Euro System and the Federal Reserve System Compared:
Facts and Challenges
Karlheinz Ruckriegel, Franz Seitz
B01-02 Does Inﬂation Targeting Matter? Manfred J. M. Neumann, Jürgen
von Hagen
2001
B29-01 Is Kazakhstan Vulnerable to the Dutch Disease? Karlygash Kuralbayeva, Ali M. Ku-
tan, Michael L. Wyzan
B28-01 Political Economy of the Nice Treaty: Rebalancing the EU
Council. The Future of European Agricultural Policies
Deutsch-Französisches Wirt-
schaftspolitisches Forum
B27-01 Investor Panic, IMF Actions, and Emerging Stock Market Re-
turns and Volatility: A Panel Investigation
Bernd Hayo, Ali M. Kutan
B26-01 Regional Eﬀects of Terrorism on Tourism: Evidence from Three
Mediterranean Countries
Konstantinos Drakos, Ali M. Ku-
tan
B25-01 Monetary Convergence of the EU Candidates to the Euro: A
Theoretical Framework and Policy Implications
Lucjan T. Orlowski
B24-01 Disintegration and Trade Jarko and Jan Fidrmuc
B23-01 Migration and Adjustment to Shocks in Transition Economies Jan Fidrmuc
B22-01 Strategic Delegation and International Capital Taxation Matthias Brückner
B21-01 Balkan and Mediterranean Candidates for European Union
Membership: The Convergence of Their Monetary Policy With
That of the Europaen Central Bank
Josef C. Brada, Ali M. Kutan
B20-01 An Empirical Inquiry of the Eﬃciency of Intergovernmental
Transfers for Water Projects Based on the WRDA Data
Anna Rubinchik-Pessach
B19-01 Detrending and the Money-Output Link: International Evi-
dence
R.W. Hafer, Ali M. KutanB18-01 Monetary Policy in Unknown Territory. The European Central
Bank in the Early Years
Jürgen von Hagen, Matthias
Brückner
B17-01 Executive Authority, the Personal Vote, and Budget Discipline
in Latin American and Carribean Countries
Mark Hallerberg, Patrick Marier
B16-01 Sources of Inﬂation and Output Fluctuations in Poland and
Hungary: Implications for Full Membership in the European
Union
Selahattin Dibooglu, Ali M. Kutan
B15-01 Programs Without Alternative: Public Pensions in the OECD Christian E. Weller
B14-01 Formal Fiscal Restraints and Budget Processes As Solutions to
a Deﬁcit and Spending Bias in Public Finances - U.S. Experi-
ence and Possible Lessons for EMU
Rolf R. Strauch, Jürgen von Hagen
B13-01 German Public Finances: Recent Experiences and Future Chal-
lenges
Jürgen von Hagen, Rolf R. Strauch
B12-01 The Impact of Eastern Enlargement On EU-Labour Markets.
Pensions Reform Between Economic and Political Problems
Deutsch-Französisches Wirt-
schaftspolitisches Forum
B11-01 Inﬂationary Performance in a Monetary Union With Large Wa-
ge Setters
Lilia Cavallar
B10-01 Integration of the Baltic States into the EU and Institutions
of Fiscal Convergence: A Critical Evaluation of Key Issues and
Empirical Evidence
Ali M. Kutan, Niina Pautola-Mol
B09-01 Democracy in Transition Economies: Grease or Sand in the
Wheels of Growth?
Jan Fidrmuc
B08-01 The Functioning of Economic Policy Coordination Jürgen von Hagen, Susanne
Mundschenk
B07-01 The Convergence of Monetary Policy Between Candidate
Countries and the European Union
Josef C. Brada, Ali M. Kutan
B06-01 Opposites Attract: The Case of Greek and Turkish Financial
Markets
Konstantinos Drakos, Ali M. Ku-
tan
B05-01 Trade Rules and Global Governance: A Long Term Agenda.
The Future of Banking.
Deutsch-Französisches Wirt-
schaftspolitisches Forum
B04-01 The Determination of Unemployment Beneﬁts Rafael di Tella, Robert J. Mac-
Culloch
B03-01 Preferences Over Inﬂation and Unemployment: Evidence from
Surveys of Happiness
Rafael di Tella, Robert J. Mac-
Culloch, Andrew J. Oswald
B02-01 The Konstanz Seminar on Monetary Theory and Policy at Thir-
ty
Michele Fratianni, Jürgen von Ha-
gen
B01-01 Divided Boards: Partisanship Through Delegated Monetary Po-
licy
Etienne Farvaque, Gael Lagadec
2000
B20-00 Breakin-up a Nation, From the Inside Etienne Farvaque
B19-00 Income Dynamics and Stability in the Transition Process, ge-
neral Reﬂections applied to the Czech Republic
Jens Hölscher
B18-00 Budget Processes: Theory and Experimental Evidence Karl-Martin Ehrhart, Roy Gardner,
Jürgen von Hagen, Claudia Keser
B17-00 Rückführung der Landwirtschaftspolitik in die Verantwortung
der Mitgliedsstaaten? - Rechts- und Verfassungsfragen des Ge-
meinschaftsrechts
Martin Seidel
B16-00 The European Central Bank: Independence and Accountability Christa Randzio-Plath, Tomasso
Padoa-Schioppa
B15-00 Regional Risk Sharing and Redistribution in the German Fede-
ration
Jürgen von Hagen, Ralf Hepp
B14-00 Sources of Real Exchange Rate Fluctuations in Transition Eco-
nomies: The Case of Poland and Hungary
Selahattin Dibooglu, Ali M. Kutan
B13-00 Back to the Future: The Growth Prospects of Transition Eco-
nomies Reconsidered
Nauro F. CamposB12-00 Rechtsetzung und Rechtsangleichung als Folge der Einheitli-
chen Europäischen Währung
Martin Seidel
B11-00 A Dynamic Approach to Inﬂation Targeting in Transition Eco-
nomies
Lucjan T. Orlowski
B10-00 The Importance of Domestic Political Institutions: Why and
How Belgium Qualiﬁed for EMU
Marc Hallerberg
B09-00 Rational Institutions Yield Hysteresis Rafael Di Tella, Robert Mac-
Culloch
B08-00 The Eﬀectiveness of Self-Protection Policies for Safeguarding
Emerging Market Economies from Crises
Kenneth Kletzer
B07-00 Financial Supervision and Policy Coordination in The EMU Deutsch-Französisches Wirt-
schaftspolitisches Forum
B06-00 The Demand for Money in Austria Bernd Hayo
B05-00 Liberalization, Democracy and Economic Performance during
Transition
Jan Fidrmuc
B04-00 A New Political Culture in The EU - Democratic Accountability
of the ECB
Christa Randzio-Plath
B03-00 Integration, Disintegration and Trade in Europe: Evolution of
Trade Relations during the 1990’s
Jarko Fidrmuc, Jan Fidrmuc
B02-00 Inﬂation Bias and Productivity Shocks in Transition Economies:
The Case of the Czech Republic
Josef C. Barda, Arthur E. King, Ali
M. Kutan
B01-00 Monetary Union and Fiscal Federalism Kenneth Kletzer, Jürgen von Ha-
gen
1999
B26-99 Skills, Labour Costs, and Vertically Diﬀerentiated Industries: A
General Equilibrium Analysis
Stefan Lutz, Alessandro Turrini
B25-99 Micro and Macro Determinants of Public Support for Market
Reforms in Eastern Europe
Bernd Hayo
B24-99 What Makes a Revolution? Robert MacCulloch
B23-99 Informal Family Insurance and the Design of the Welfare State Rafael Di Tella, Robert Mac-
Culloch
B22-99 Partisan Social Happiness Rafael Di Tella, Robert Mac-
Culloch
B21-99 The End of Moderate Inﬂation in Three Transition Economies? Josef C. Brada, Ali M. Kutan
B20-99 Subnational Government Bailouts in Germany Helmut Seitz
B19-99 The Evolution of Monetary Policy in Transition Economies Ali M. Kutan, Josef C. Brada
B18-99 Why are Eastern Europe’s Banks not failing when everybody
else’s are?
Christian E. Weller, Bernard Mor-
zuch
B17-99 Stability of Monetary Unions: Lessons from the Break-Up of
Czechoslovakia
Jan Fidrmuc, Julius Horvath and
Jarko Fidrmuc
B16-99 Multinational Banks and Development Finance Christian E.Weller and Mark J.
Scher
B15-99 Financial Crises after Financial Liberalization: Exceptional Cir-
cumstances or Structural Weakness?
Christian E. Weller
B14-99 Industry Eﬀects of Monetary Policy in Germany Bernd Hayo and Birgit Uhlenbrock
B13-99 Fiancial Fragility or What Went Right and What Could Go
Wrong in Central European Banking?
Christian E. Weller and Jürgen von
Hagen
B12 -99 Size Distortions of Tests of the Null Hypothesis of Stationarity:
Evidence and Implications for Applied Work
Mehmet Caner and Lutz Kilian
B11-99 Financial Supervision and Policy Coordination in the EMU Deutsch-Französisches Wirt-
schaftspolitisches Forum
B10-99 Financial Liberalization, Multinational Banks and Credit Sup-
ply: The Case of Poland
Christian Weller
B09-99 Monetary Policy, Parameter Uncertainty and Optimal Learning Volker Wieland
B08-99 The Connection between more Multinational Banks and less
Real Credit in Transition Economies
Christian WellerB07-99 Comovement and Catch-up in Productivity across Sectors: Evi-
dence from the OECD
Christopher M. Cornwell and Jens-
Uwe Wächter
B06-99 Productivity Convergence and Economic Growth: A Frontier
Production Function Approach
Christopher M. Cornwell and Jens-
Uwe Wächter
B05-99 Tumbling Giant: Germany‘s Experience with the Maastricht
Fiscal Criteria
Jürgen von Hagen and Rolf
Strauch
B04-99 The Finance-Investment Link in a Transition Economy: Evi-
dence for Poland from Panel Data
Christian Weller
B03-99 The Macroeconomics of Happiness Rafael Di Tella, Robert Mac-
Culloch and Andrew J. Oswald
B02-99 The Consequences of Labour Market Flexibility: Panel Evidence
Based on Survey Data
Rafael Di Tella and Robert Mac-
Culloch
B01-99 The Excess Volatility of Foreign Exchange Rates: Statistical
Puzzle or Theoretical Artifact?
Robert B.H. Hauswald
1998
B16-98 Labour Market + Tax Policy in the EMU Deutsch-Französisches Wirt-
schaftspolitisches Forum
B15-98 Can Taxing Foreign Competition Harm the Domestic Industry? Stefan Lutz
B14-98 Free Trade and Arms Races: Some Thoughts Regarding EU-
Russian Trade
Rafael Reuveny and John Maxwell
B13-98 Fiscal Policy and Intranational Risk-Sharing Jürgen von Hagen
B12-98 Price Stability and Monetary Policy Eﬀectiveness when Nomi-
nal Interest Rates are Bounded at Zero
Athanasios Orphanides and Volker
Wieland
B11A-98 Die Bewertung der "dauerhaft tragbaren öﬀentlichen Finanz-
lage"der EU Mitgliedstaaten beim Übergang zur dritten Stufe
der EWWU
Rolf Strauch
B11-98 Exchange Rate Regimes in the Transition Economies: Case Stu-
dy of the Czech Republic: 1990-1997
Julius Horvath and Jiri Jonas
B10-98 Der Wettbewerb der Rechts- und politischen Systeme in der
Europäischen Union
Martin Seidel
B09-98 U.S. Monetary Policy and Monetary Policy and the ESCB Robert L. Hetzel
B08-98 Money-Output Granger Causality Revisited: An Empirical Ana-
lysis of EU Countries (überarbeitete Version zum Herunterla-
den)
Bernd Hayo
B07-98 Designing Voluntary Environmental Agreements in Europe: So-
me Lessons from the U.S. EPA’s 33/50 Program
John W. Maxwell
B06-98 Monetary Union, Asymmetric Productivity Shocks and Fiscal
Insurance: an Analytical Discussion of Welfare Issues
Kenneth Kletzer
B05-98 Estimating a European Demand for Money (überarbeitete Ver-
sion zum Herunterladen)
Bernd Hayo
B04-98 The EMU’s Exchange Rate Policy Deutsch-Französisches Wirt-
schaftspolitisches Forum
B03-98 Central Bank Policy in a More Perfect Financial System Jürgen von Hagen / Ingo Fender
B02-98 Trade with Low-Wage Countries and Wage Inequality Jaleel Ahmad
B01-98 Budgeting Institutions for Aggregate Fiscal Discipline Jürgen von Hagen
1997
B04-97 Macroeconomic Stabilization with a Common Currency: Does
European Monetary Uniﬁcation Create a Need for Fiscal Ins-
urance or Federalism?
Kenneth Kletzer
B-03-97 Liberalising European Markets for Energy and Telecommunica-
tions: Some Lessons from the US Electric Utility Industry
Tom Lyon / John Mayo
B02-97 Employment and EMU Deutsch-Französisches Wirt-
schaftspolitisches Forum
B01-97 A Stability Pact for Europe (a Forum organized by ZEI)ISSN 1436 - 6053
Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung
Center for European Integration Studies
Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn
Walter-Flex-Strasse 3 Tel.: +49-228-73-1732
D-53113 Bonn Fax: +49-228-73-1809
Germany www.zei.de